



Interpreting Cyber-Threat Indicators in Enterprise Memory Forensics: A Mixed-Methods Study of Machine Learning Performance and Explainability

Aminul Islam Miraz¹;

[1]. Bachelor of Business Administration (BBA), Taylor's University, Malaysia;
Email: aminulmiraz26@gmail.com

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Abstract

This study examines the interpretation of cyber-threat indicators in enterprise memory-forensic environments by integrating machine-learning performance, forensic evidence quality, explainable artificial intelligence, and analyst decision support within a unified empirical framework. The research addresses the problem that enterprise investigators must interpret large volumes of volatile-memory evidence containing processes, modules, network connections, privileges, injected regions, and other runtime artifacts, while conventional manual procedures and opaque machine-learning classifications may not provide sufficiently transparent, efficient, or defensible threat assessments. The purpose of the study is to determine the individual and combined effects of Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, and Analyst Decision-Support Capability on Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. A quantitative, cross-sectional, case-study-based research design was applied across selected enterprise cybersecurity, digital-forensic, security-operations, incident-response, and threat-analysis cases, including financial services, technology and cloud-service environments, government and critical infrastructure, telecommunications, and other enterprise settings. The purposive sample comprised cybersecurity and SOC analysts, digital-forensic investigators, malware analysts, incident-response professionals, threat-intelligence specialists, security engineers, and related practitioners. Of 320 questionnaires distributed, 301 were returned and 289 valid responses were retained, yielding a usable response rate of 90.3%. Reliability was strong, with Cronbach's alpha values ranging from .85 to .91, KMO = .892, and Bartlett's Test $p < .001$. CTIP recorded $M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.51$. MFIIE demonstrated the strongest correlation with CTIP, $r = .76$, followed by XAIQ, $r = .72$, ADSC, $r = .70$, and MLTDC, $r = .68$, all $p < .001$. The regression model explained 71.4% of CTIP variance, $R^2 = .714$, adjusted $R^2 = .710$, $F(4,284) = 177.25$, $p < .001$. MFIIE emerged as the strongest predictor, $\beta = .32$, followed by XAIQ, $\beta = .28$, ADSC, $\beta = .23$, and MLTDC, $\beta = .19$. The findings support H1 through H4 and imply that effective enterprise cyber-threat interpretation depends on the coordinated integration of accurate machine-learning detection, reliable memory-forensic evidence identification, understandable AI explanations, and analyst-centered decision support.

Keywords

Enterprise Memory Forensics; Cyber-Threat Interpretation; Machine Learning Threat Detection; Explainable Artificial Intelligence; Analyst Decision Support

INTRODUCTION

Cyber-threat indicators can be defined as observable, measurable, or inferable signs within a digital environment that signal malicious activity, system compromise, unauthorized execution, anomalous behavior, or other security-relevant events. Within enterprise cybersecurity investigations, these indicators may originate from network traffic, operating-system logs, persistent storage, endpoint telemetry, application activity, and volatile system memory. Among these sources, volatile memory is particularly valuable because it preserves the active computational state of a running system, including processes, dynamically loaded libraries, network connections, memory mappings, encryption material, credentials, kernel objects, injected code, and other runtime artifacts that may disappear when a system is powered down. Memory forensics therefore refers to the systematic acquisition, reconstruction, examination, and interpretation of volatile-memory contents for investigative and cybersecurity purposes. Early forensic research established that physical memory could preserve evidentiary information unavailable through conventional disk-centered analysis and demonstrated systematic methods for recovering structured digital objects from volatile memory (Petroni et al., 2006; Schatz, 2007). The reliability of such investigations depends heavily on the quality of memory acquisition, the reconstruction of operating-system structures, and the integrity of the analytical process (Inoue et al., 2011; Vömel & Freiling, 2011). Research across computing platforms has also shown that memory examination can expose active and recently terminated processes, network activity, memory-resident code, loaded modules, and other transient evidence that may be lost through conventional storage analysis (Sylve et al., 2012). Memory forensics has consequently become an important element of digital investigation because structured examination of application and kernel memory can reconstruct information that persistent-storage analysis alone may not adequately capture (Case & Richard, 2017). The international significance of this capability is substantial because financial institutions, healthcare organizations, government agencies, telecommunications providers, cloud environments, manufacturing systems, and critical infrastructure increasingly depend on continuously operating digital systems exposed to malware, credential theft, remote exploitation, fileless attacks, process injection, and other forms of cyber intrusion. In such environments, investigators must determine whether individual memory artifacts represent normal activity, suspicious behavior, or reliable evidence of compromise, making cyber-threat interpretation a central analytical task in enterprise memory forensics.

The complexity of enterprise memory analysis increases when investigators must examine large, heterogeneous, and high-dimensional collections of runtime artifacts that cannot be processed efficiently through manual examination or conventional signature-based procedures alone. Modern malicious software may use code obfuscation, packing, process hollowing, dynamic injection, privilege manipulation, polymorphism, anti-forensic techniques, and other mechanisms designed to interfere with traditional detection methods. The forensic analysis process may also be affected by corrupted structures, intentional manipulation, operating-system differences, and inconsistencies introduced during memory acquisition or processing, all of which can influence the accuracy of automated extraction and interpretation (Case et al., 2017). These analytical conditions have encouraged extensive use of data mining and machine learning within malware detection and cybersecurity research. Data-driven approaches can distinguish malicious and legitimate patterns by identifying statistical relationships among multiple behavioral, structural, and operational features rather than relying exclusively on predefined signatures (Souri & Hosseini, 2018). Deep-learning approaches have also demonstrated the ability to classify malware from complex representations while reducing dependence on manually designed signatures and highly specialized feature engineering (Le et al., 2018). Broader analyses of malware research have shown that machine-learning methods can support automated classification through static, behavioral, and hybrid feature representations, although model effectiveness remains strongly dependent on data quality, feature construction, validation procedures, and experimental design (Ucci et al., 2019). Deep neural models have demonstrated strong discriminatory capacity across malware-detection tasks, while evaluations have also emphasized the importance of model robustness, dataset representativeness, false-positive behavior, and generalization across different malicious families (Vinayakumar et al., 2019; Zhong & Gu, 2019). Research reviewing machine-learning-based malware analysis has further demonstrated that feature


representation remains a central determinant of model performance because algorithms can only identify meaningful malicious patterns when relevant attributes are adequately captured and encoded (Gibert et al., 2020). Within enterprise memory forensics, this issue is especially important because memory images contain measurable attributes associated with processes, DLLs, handles, privileges, network connections, injected memory regions, executable objects, and anomalous runtime behavior. Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability can therefore be examined as the degree to which automated analytical models identify malicious patterns, distinguish normal and abnormal memory behavior, and process complex memory-derived threat indicators with sufficient predictive effectiveness.

The integration of memory-forensic evidence with machine-learning techniques creates a specialized analytical environment in which volatile artifacts can be converted into structured variables and used for automated cyber-threat detection and interpretation. Rather than treating physical memory exclusively as raw evidence for manual forensic examination, research has demonstrated that characteristics extracted from memory images can serve as machine-learning features for identifying malicious activity. Memory representations have been transformed into alternative analytical formats and processed using machine-learning and computer-vision techniques to distinguish malware-related patterns from legitimate system behavior (Bozkir et al., 2021). Other research has extracted memory-oriented behavioral features associated with process activity, DLL behavior, code injection, privilege use, system calls, and command-and-control communication and used them to classify malicious and benign observations (Sihwail et al., 2021). These approaches are directly relevant to Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness because accurate cyber-threat interpretation depends on the ability to locate, extract, structure, and differentiate technically significant indicators from ordinary runtime activities. Memory analysis datasets have also been evaluated within larger computational environments using multiple machine-learning and deep-learning models, demonstrating that volatile-memory attributes can support automated malware classification when appropriate preprocessing and model-selection procedures are applied (Dener et al., 2022). Related work integrating memory forensics, image representation, and machine learning has shown that memory-based observations can be incorporated into automated detection pipelines without restricting analysis to conventional executable-file inspection (Shah et al., 2022). These findings establish an important distinction between automated classification and forensic interpretation. A machine-learning model may correctly predict that a memory image, process, or extracted observation is malicious while still providing limited information concerning which indicators influenced that classification, how different forensic attributes contributed to the predicted result, or whether the identified relationships are technically meaningful to an investigator. The interpretation of enterprise cyber threats therefore requires more than predictive accuracy because analysts must connect model outputs with observable memory evidence, understand relationships among suspicious processes and artifacts, assess the relevance of identified features, and establish whether the automated judgment corresponds to a defensible forensic interpretation.

Explainable artificial intelligence addresses the interpretive limitations associated with complex machine-learning systems by focusing on whether the reasoning, influential features, or decision mechanisms associated with model predictions can be communicated in a form understandable to human users. Explainability is particularly important when a model produces a security classification but the analyst needs to determine why the observation was categorized as malicious, suspicious, or benign. Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations introduced a widely used model-agnostic method for explaining individual classifier decisions through locally interpretable approximations of complex predictive behavior (Ribeiro et al., 2016). Research examining deep neural networks has similarly demonstrated that influential input components can be identified and visualized, allowing analysts to investigate the features contributing to otherwise opaque predictions (Samek et al., 2017). Explainability research has subsequently organized interpretability methods according to the type of black-box model, the level of explanation, the representation of explanatory information, and the specific analytical task being addressed (Guidotti et al., 2018). Explanations are also fundamentally human-centered because their usefulness depends on how users understand causal or evidential reasons, compare alternatives, and interpret information in relation to their existing knowledge and decision-making requirements (Miller, 2019). Research on high-stakes machine-learning environments

has additionally distinguished inherently interpretable models from post-hoc explanation techniques applied to opaque predictive systems, emphasizing that predictive complexity and interpretability should not automatically be treated as interchangeable concepts (Rudin, 2019). A broad taxonomy of explainable artificial intelligence has further differentiated transparent models, post-hoc methods, local explanations, global explanations, model-specific approaches, and model-agnostic approaches while emphasizing the role of explanation recipients (Arrieta et al., 2020). Human-centered evaluation of explainable AI has similarly shown that explanation quality should be assessed according to user goals, cognitive requirements, interaction contexts, and the characteristics of the task for which an explanation is generated (Mohseni et al., 2021). In enterprise memory forensics, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality can therefore be operationalized through clarity, comprehensibility, relevance, transparency, consistency, and the ability of an explanation to identify the memory-derived features influencing a particular threat classification.

Figure 1: Enterprise Memory-Forensic Cyber-Threat Interpretation Framework



The relationship between predictive performance, explanation quality, and analyst-oriented cybersecurity decision support has become increasingly important within research on machine-learning-based security systems. Explainable intrusion-detection research has shown that model interpretation techniques can identify the features contributing to malicious traffic classifications and provide additional information beyond a conventional attack label (Wang et al., 2020). Security-focused evaluation of explanation methods has also demonstrated that explanations can be assessed according to properties such as fidelity, completeness, efficiency, stability, and robustness, which are particularly important when model outputs are used within adversarial or technically complex environments (Warnecke et al., 2020). The role of human analysts is central because enterprise cybersecurity investigations involve examining evidence, prioritizing alerts, validating machine-generated assessments, relating isolated artifacts to attack contexts, and deciding which observations require further investigation. Explainable artificial intelligence has therefore been examined as an interactive capability through which automated models can work alongside cyber analysts by providing interpretable information about detected security events (Holder & Wang, 2021). Research has also

connected explainability with intrusion-detection performance by examining how understandable model decisions can support the analysis of complex security classifications (Dang, 2021). Cybersecurity-specific explainable AI studies have further investigated the use of interpretation methods for understanding black-box security models and identifying the characteristics responsible for automated cyber classifications (Sharma et al., 2022). Explainability has also been used to investigate malware classifiers that report strong predictive accuracy, revealing whether model decisions are actually associated with meaningful malicious behavior or with unintended characteristics of the training data (Liu et al., 2022). Similar approaches have incorporated explainable artificial intelligence into intrusion-detection systems to provide interpretable representations of the features influencing attack classifications (Patil et al., 2022). Existing research therefore provides substantial evidence concerning machine-learning malware detection, memory-forensic feature extraction, explainable artificial intelligence, and intrusion-detection interpretation, yet these streams have often been examined separately. The integrated relationships among Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, Analyst Decision-Support Capability, and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance remain less directly examined within enterprise memory-forensic settings. The present study adopts a quantitative, cross-sectional, case-study-based design and employs a five-point Likert scale to measure these constructs among relevant cybersecurity and digital-forensic professionals. Descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation analysis, and multiple regression modeling are used to test the proposed relationships and corresponding hypotheses.

Background of the Study

The increasing dependence of modern enterprises on interconnected digital infrastructures has significantly expanded the volume, complexity, and operational importance of cybersecurity data generated during routine computing activities and security incidents. Among the various sources of digital evidence available to investigators, volatile memory has become particularly important because it captures the active state of a computer system at a specific moment and may preserve information that is unavailable or incomplete in persistent storage. Running and recently terminated processes, dynamically loaded libraries, network connections, executable code, memory-resident malware, injected processes, authentication information, command histories, kernel structures, and other temporary artifacts can remain accessible within system memory and provide valuable evidence concerning malicious activity. Enterprise memory forensics therefore represents an important component of digital investigation because it enables cybersecurity analysts and forensic professionals to reconstruct activities occurring within compromised systems and identify indicators associated with malware execution, unauthorized access, privilege abuse, lateral movement, command-and-control communication, and other forms of cyber intrusion. The increasing size and complexity of memory images, however, have made entirely manual forensic interpretation difficult, particularly in enterprise environments where investigators may need to process evidence from numerous endpoints and rapidly distinguish meaningful threat indicators from legitimate system activity. Machine learning has created an alternative analytical mechanism by enabling automated models to recognize patterns among large groups of forensic features, classify suspicious activities, identify anomalies, and prioritize observations for further analysis. Predictive performance alone may not provide sufficient analytical support because complex machine-learning models can generate security classifications without clearly showing the evidence responsible for those classifications. Explainable artificial intelligence has consequently become relevant to memory-forensic analysis by providing mechanisms through which analysts can examine influential features, understand machine-generated predictions, and assess whether automated classifications correspond to technically meaningful evidence. The effectiveness of enterprise cyber-threat interpretation can therefore depend on several interconnected capabilities, including Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, and Analyst Decision-Support Capability. Examining these capabilities together provides a structured basis for understanding how automated forensic analytics and human interpretation interact within enterprise cybersecurity investigations and how these combined capabilities are associated with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance.

Problem Statement

Enterprise cybersecurity teams increasingly depend on large volumes of endpoint, network, application, and system-level evidence to detect and investigate malicious activity, yet interpreting volatile-memory evidence remains a technically demanding task. Memory images may contain thousands of legitimate and suspicious objects simultaneously, making it difficult for investigators to identify which processes, memory regions, network connections, loaded modules, injected components, privileges, or behavioral artifacts represent meaningful indicators of compromise. Traditional forensic procedures depend substantially on investigator expertise, known signatures, predetermined rules, and manual examination, which can become inefficient when dealing with complex enterprise environments or previously unseen malicious behavior. Machine-learning techniques can improve the processing of large forensic datasets by identifying statistical patterns and classifying observations automatically, but high predictive accuracy does not necessarily provide investigators with sufficient understanding of why a particular object has been classified as malicious. Black-box predictions can create an analytical gap when cybersecurity professionals are unable to connect automated outputs with specific forensic evidence or determine whether the model has relied on technically meaningful characteristics. At the same time, existing studies frequently investigate malware classification, intrusion detection, memory analysis, machine-learning performance, or explainability as separate research areas. Less empirical attention has been given to the combined relationships among machine-learning detection capability, memory-forensic indicator identification, explainability quality, analyst decision support, and overall cyber-threat interpretation within enterprise memory-forensic environments. This fragmentation limits understanding of whether automated threat detection and explainable model outputs collectively contribute to effective human interpretation of volatile-memory evidence. There is therefore a need for a quantitative empirical examination capable of measuring these constructs simultaneously and determining their individual and combined relationships with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. Addressing this problem requires structured measurement of practitioner perceptions and statistical analysis capable of identifying patterns of association and predictive contribution across the major technological and analyst-oriented capabilities involved in enterprise memory-forensic investigation.

Purpose and Objectives of the Study

The primary purpose of this study is to quantitatively examine the factors associated with effective interpretation of cyber-threat indicators within enterprise memory-forensic environments by integrating machine-learning performance, forensic indicator identification, explainable artificial intelligence, and analyst decision-support capabilities within a single empirical model. The study specifically seeks to determine how Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, and Analyst Decision-Support Capability are associated with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance among professionals involved in cybersecurity, digital forensics, malware analysis, security operations, threat intelligence, and incident response. The first objective is to assess the perceived level of Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability and determine the extent to which automated analytical systems can recognize malicious patterns and distinguish suspicious memory behavior from legitimate runtime activity. The second objective is to evaluate Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness by examining the capacity to detect, extract, organize, and interpret relevant volatile-memory artifacts associated with cyber threats. The third objective is to evaluate Explainable AI Interpretability Quality by considering the clarity, relevance, transparency, consistency, and comprehensibility of explanations associated with machine-generated threat classifications. The fourth objective is to assess Analyst Decision-Support Capability and determine whether automated forensic systems provide information that supports evidence evaluation, alert prioritization, investigative reasoning, and threat assessment. The fifth objective is to examine the direction and strength of the relationships between each independent construct and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance through correlation analysis. The sixth objective is to determine the individual and combined predictive effects of the four explanatory constructs on Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance through multiple regression modeling. A quantitative, cross-sectional, case-study-based approach using a five-point Likert scale is employed to generate measurable data that can be analyzed using descriptive statistics, reliability and validity

procedures, Pearson correlation analysis, regression modeling, and hypothesis testing.

Research Hypotheses

The hypotheses of this study are developed from the proposed relationships among the four independent constructs and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance as the dependent construct. The first proposed relationship concerns Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, which represents the ability of machine-learning-enabled security systems to identify malicious patterns, distinguish abnormal memory behavior from legitimate activities, and provide sufficiently accurate threat classifications. Accordingly, H1 states that Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability has a significant positive effect on Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. The second relationship concerns Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, which reflects the capacity to identify and organize meaningful volatile-memory artifacts such as suspicious processes, injected code, anomalous memory regions, malicious network connections, unauthorized modules, and other compromise-related evidence. H2 therefore states that Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness has a significant positive effect on Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. The third relationship concerns Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, which refers to the extent to which machine-generated classifications are supported by understandable, relevant, transparent, and technically meaningful explanations. H3 states that Explainable AI Interpretability Quality has a significant positive effect on Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. The fourth proposed relationship concerns Analyst Decision-Support Capability, representing the degree to which forensic and machine-learning systems assist security professionals in evaluating evidence, prioritizing suspicious activities, interpreting model outputs, and making investigation-related decisions. H4 therefore states that Analyst Decision-Support Capability has a significant positive effect on Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. Collectively, these hypotheses establish a testable empirical model in which the four independent variables are expected to demonstrate positive relationships with the dependent variable. Pearson correlation analysis is used to determine the direction and strength of the bivariate relationships, while multiple regression analysis is used to evaluate the relative predictive contribution of each construct when the four explanatory variables are assessed simultaneously.

Significance of the Research

- i. Significance to enterprise cybersecurity: The study provides empirical evidence concerning the capabilities associated with effective interpretation of cyber-threat indicators in volatile-memory environments. By examining machine-learning detection, forensic indicator identification, explainability, and analyst decision support together, the research provides a more integrated representation of enterprise memory-forensic performance than approaches focused exclusively on classification accuracy.
- ii. Significance to digital and memory forensics: The research emphasizes the interpretation of volatile-memory evidence as an analytical process involving both automated detection and human reasoning. It provides measurable constructs that can be used to examine how effectively memory artifacts are identified, interpreted, and transformed into actionable investigative information.
- iii. Significance to machine-learning-based cybersecurity: The study distinguishes predictive capability from interpretability and analyst usefulness. This distinction is important because machine-learning models used for cybersecurity may generate technically accurate classifications without producing explanations that enable investigators to understand the underlying forensic evidence.
- iv. Significance to explainable artificial intelligence: The study situates explainability within a specific forensic context by examining whether explanation quality is associated with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. It therefore treats explainability as a measurable analytical characteristic involving clarity, transparency, relevance, consistency, and comprehensibility rather than as a purely technical model feature.
- v. Significance to cybersecurity practitioners and researchers: The findings can provide structured empirical information for security analysts, digital forensic investigators, incident-response personnel, malware analysts, threat-intelligence professionals, security engineers, and researchers interested in combining machine intelligence with forensic investigation. The statistical relationships identified through descriptive analysis, correlation analysis, and regression modeling clarify which capabilities are most strongly associated with effective threat interpretation within the examined cases. The study

also establishes an integrated research model connecting MLTDC, MFIIE, XAIQ, ADSC, and CTIP, providing a coherent empirical structure for examining enterprise memory-forensic systems.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature surrounding enterprise memory forensics, cyber-threat interpretation, machine learning, and explainable artificial intelligence represents several closely connected areas of cybersecurity scholarship. Memory forensics focuses on acquiring and examining volatile system information that can reveal runtime activities, malicious processes, injected code, network connections, credentials, loaded libraries, kernel objects, and other transient evidence associated with cyber incidents. As cyber threats have become more technically complex, the analytical challenge has moved beyond simply recovering memory artifacts toward determining which recovered objects are meaningful indicators of malicious activity. Machine-learning research contributes to this problem by providing statistical and computational techniques capable of recognizing patterns across high-dimensional security data, differentiating legitimate and malicious observations, and automating portions of the threat-detection process. The performance of such models is commonly evaluated through their ability to correctly classify security observations, yet predictive performance represents only one component of effective forensic analysis. Cybersecurity investigations require analysts to understand the evidence associated with a classification, determine whether identified features are technically meaningful, and relate individual indicators to a broader attack context. Explainable artificial intelligence consequently provides another important literature stream because it addresses the transparency and interpretability of machine-learning decisions by identifying the factors that contribute to model outputs. Human-centered cybersecurity research also emphasizes the role of analyst decision support because automated systems operate within investigative processes in which professional judgment remains necessary for evidence validation, prioritization, contextual interpretation, and response decisions. The literature review therefore examines the research problem through six interconnected areas: enterprise memory forensics and cyber-threat indicator interpretation; machine learning for threat detection in enterprise memory environments; explainable artificial intelligence in cybersecurity and digital forensics; analyst decision support and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance; Information Processing Theory as the theoretical foundation of the study; and the conceptual framework linking the four explanatory constructs with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance.


Enterprise Memory Forensics and Cyber-Threat Indicator Interpretation

Enterprise memory forensics concerns the acquisition, reconstruction, and interpretation of volatile data held in random access memory while a computing system is operating or immediately after an incident has been captured. In enterprise environments, this analysis is important because many security-relevant artifacts exist only temporarily and may never be written to persistent storage in a recoverable form. Running processes, loaded modules, network sockets, open handles, authentication material, encryption keys, injected code, memory mappings, kernel objects, and process-specific data can collectively reveal the operational state of a compromised endpoint. These artifacts can expose relationships among executable activity, network communication, privilege use, persistence mechanisms, and malicious code execution. Structured memory-analysis research demonstrated that investigators could move beyond basic string searching by dynamically reconstructing operating-system data structures and recovering process, networking, file, and kernel information from memory images, enabling richer interpretation of system activity at acquisition ([Case et al., 2010](#); [Md. Abdur & Iftekhar, 2021](#)). Related work showed that Windows memory analysis could be made less dependent on hard-coded operating-system versions by using embedded debugging information and program database structures to identify and parse process, registry, and network communication artifacts across several Windows configurations ([Kazi Rakib Hasan & Adnan, 2022](#); [Okolica & Peterson, 2010](#)). These developments are directly relevant to cyber-threat indicator interpretation because the usefulness of volatile evidence depends not only on acquiring a memory image but also on transforming low-level binary content into structured and meaningful objects ([Ashik & Shabbir, 2022](#); [Kazi Rakib Hasan & Adnan, 2022](#)). In enterprise investigations, an isolated artifact such as an unusual process, suspicious socket, or unexpected module rarely provides sufficient understanding by itself. Interpretation requires analysts to connect multiple indicators, compare them with expected system behavior, and determine whether their combined pattern is consistent with malicious execution ([Mahbubul et al., 2022](#);

Mashfiqur & Md, 2022; Mashiat & Md Anisur Rahman, 2022). Memory forensics therefore functions as both an evidentiary discipline and an analytical mechanism through which transient cyber-threat indicators can be reconstructed into a coherent representation of compromised system behavior (Md & Gazi Yeasin, 2022; Md Ashfaq & Abdullah Mohammad, 2022; Mst Kaniz & Jahanara, 2022).

The reliability of cyber-threat interpretation is shaped by the integrity of the memory-acquisition and analysis process because enterprise investigators may be examining a host that is actively compromised and capable of interfering with forensic tools (Sadia & Maishar Mostari, 2022; Shaiful et al., 2022; Stabak & Md Shahid, 2022). Software-based acquisition utilities often execute within the same environment that may contain malicious code, creating opportunities for rootkits or privileged threats to manipulate acquisition requests, alter returned memory content, conceal selected pages, or disrupt collection (Abdullah Mohammad, 2023; Adnan & Iftekhhar, 2023; Syed Feroz & Md Mahamud Pervaz, 2022). Research evaluating anti-forensic resistance found that several memory-acquisition tools could be subverted by simple adversarial techniques and proposed a resilient approach based on direct page-table manipulation and PCI hardware introspection, showing that a technically correct tool under laboratory conditions may still be vulnerable against a hostile system (Mahbubul et al., 2022; Stüttgen & Cohen, 2013).

Figure 2: Enterprise Memory Forensics and Threat Indicator Interpretation Framework



This issue is important for enterprise incident response because cyber-threat indicators are meaningful only when analysts can place confidence in the completeness and authenticity of the memory image from which those indicators were extracted (Ahmed & Nuzhat Sadia, 2023; Asheke, 2023; Gazi Yeasin, 2023). The challenge becomes more complicated when malware executes outside conventional host-processing paths. Research on GPU-assisted malware demonstrated that malicious computation can be shifted to graphics-processing resources in ways that conceal portions of malicious behavior from ordinary host-memory examination while leaving other artifacts available for detection (Balzarotti et al., 2015; Mashfiqur & Md, 2022). These findings show that memory-forensic interpretation cannot be reduced to one known signature. Analysts must carefully consider acquisition trustworthiness, component visibility, and the possibility that adversarial software has altered or concealed observable evidence (Jahanara & Mst Kaniz, 2023; Md Anisur Rahman, 2023; Md Asif Ali Sheak & Tahmedur, 2023). Consequently, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness represents more than the technical ability to extract artifacts (Md Kaium, 2023; Md Mahamud Pervaz, 2023; Mohammad Badrul & Md. Mominul, 2023). It reflects the ability to recognize relevant indicators, distinguish misleading observations, organize artifacts into investigative categories, and identify relationships among processes, memory regions, network activity, modules, privileges, and other system-state evidence.

Such effectiveness determines whether volatile-memory data can be converted into reliable cyber-threat information within enterprise forensic operations (Molla Al Rakib & Mohammad Towhidul, 2023; Mukut Kanti, 2023; Nishat, 2023).

Enterprise memory forensics is closely associated with detecting threats that minimize persistent traces, because volatile analysis can expose execution evidence that conventional disk-oriented investigation may not capture adequately (Nuzhat Sadia, 2023; Risha & Mst Shurovi, 2023; Stabak & Md Siam, 2023). The field has developed from basic text and signature searches toward process analysis, malware examination, memory-object interpretation, and automated identification of suspicious behavior (Abdullah Mohammad, 2024; Syed Feroz, 2023; Tahmedur & Rifat, 2023). A review of volatile-memory forensics emphasized that RAM analysis is especially relevant to fileless malware and other threats that avoid conventional detection while leaving observable traces in system memory, and it documented the importance of acquisition methods and detection techniques across cybersecurity investigations (Md Ashfaq & Abdullah Mohammad, 2022; Nyholm et al., 2022). For enterprise settings, this development broadens the meaning of a cyber-threat indicator. An indicator is not limited to a malicious hash, filename, or network address; it may also consist of an abnormal relationship among runtime objects, an unexpected memory allocation, an irregular parent-child process relationship, an unusual privilege configuration, or a pattern of network and process behavior whose significance emerges only when several forensic observations are interpreted together (Ahmed, 2024; Asheke, 2024; Ashrafuzzaman, 2024). This view aligns with the present research because Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance concerns how effectively security professionals convert memory-derived observations into assessments of malicious activity (Mashiat, 2024; Md Kaium, 2024; Mukut Kanti, 2024). The process requires technical extraction and contextual reasoning. Analysts must determine whether an indicator is genuine, whether it is associated with legitimate enterprise software or malicious execution, how strongly it supports a threat assessment, and how it relates to other evidence from the same system. These requirements establish the basis for incorporating machine learning and explainability into enterprise memory forensics (Syed Feroz, 2024; Uddin & Risha, 2024). Machine-learning models can assist with pattern recognition across memory-derived attributes, while explainability mechanisms can help analysts understand which indicators influenced a classification. The quality of forensic indicators remains fundamental because automated models and human analysts depend on the accuracy, relevance, and interpretability of memory evidence supplied to the investigative process.


Machine Learning for Threat Detection in Enterprise Memory Environments

Machine learning has become a central analytical approach for cyber-threat detection because it allows security systems to identify statistical patterns that distinguish malicious activity from legitimate computing behavior. In enterprise environments, this capability is especially valuable when analysts must process large volumes of executable, behavioral, and memory-derived information that exceed the practical limits of manual inspection. Traditional signature-based methods depend on previously identified malicious patterns and can therefore struggle with newly modified or previously unseen malware. Machine-learning approaches address this limitation by representing software through measurable features and learning decision boundaries from labeled or unlabeled observations. Static features may include opcode frequencies, byte patterns, imported functions, header attributes, strings, and structural properties, while dynamic features can capture runtime actions such as API calls, process creation, registry modification, network communication, and memory manipulation. Research using opcode-sequence representations demonstrated that data-mining algorithms could detect previously unseen malware by learning frequencies and relationships among operational-code sequences rather than relying exclusively on fixed signatures (Sadia & Maishar Mostari, 2022; Santos et al., 2013). This approach established the analytical value of converting low-level executable characteristics into structured variables that classifiers can evaluate systematically. For enterprise memory forensics, a similar principle applies because volatile-memory images contain numerous observable characteristics that can be transformed into model inputs, including process attributes, loaded modules, suspicious memory regions, handles, privileges, and network artifacts. Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability therefore depends on more than the selection of a particular algorithm. It also requires appropriate feature representation, reliable training data, balanced classification conditions, and evaluation procedures that measure whether a model can discriminate malicious and benign behavior

consistently. These elements determine whether machine learning can provide useful automated assistance within enterprise cyber-threat investigations. In practical security operations, the value of classification also depends on timeliness, reproducibility, scalability, and the capacity to generalize reliably across heterogeneous enterprise systems.

Behavior-based machine learning extends threat detection beyond static program characteristics by examining what software does during execution. This distinction is important for enterprise memory environments because many forensic indicators are generated through runtime activity rather than remaining visible in an executable file. Malware can alter processes, allocate or inject memory, communicate with remote infrastructure, access files, modify registry locations, create child processes, or invoke operating-system services, producing behavioral evidence that can be captured and transformed into analytical features. A behavior-based model using application programming interface traces showed that actions derived from runtime API sequences could support classification with decision trees, random forests, and support vector machines, demonstrating that semantic behavioral features can distinguish malware variants even when their binary structures differ (Galal et al., 2016; Shaiful et al., 2022). The temporal dimension of behavior is also important because threat detection may need to occur before a malicious program completes its intended operation. Recurrent neural networks have been used to analyze short behavioral sequences and classify executables during the earliest stage of execution, with evidence showing that malicious and benign programs can be differentiated from limited snapshots of runtime activity (Abdullah Mohammad, 2023; Rhode et al., 2018).

Figure 3: Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability Framework



These findings are relevant to memory forensics because a memory image captures a system state produced by sequences of preceding actions. Processes, sockets, injected regions, modules, and privilege configurations can therefore be interpreted as observable consequences of dynamic behavior. Machine-learning systems that exploit such evidence may assist analysts in identifying combinations of indicators that are difficult to recognize through isolated rules. However, performance depends on the representativeness of behavioral data, the timing of observation, feature stability, class balance, and resistance to evasion. Enterprise threat detection therefore requires models capable of recognizing malicious behavior while maintaining sufficient sensitivity to detect meaningful threats and sufficient specificity to avoid overwhelming analysts with false alarms.

Deep learning has expanded machine-learning-based malware detection by enabling models to learn complex feature representations directly from structured or sequential security data. This capability is relevant to enterprise threat analysis because malicious behavior may be encoded across long sequences and interactions that cannot be represented adequately through a small number of manually

selected variables. Opcode-based deep learning illustrates how sequential information can be compressed and classified while retaining relationships among instructions. A convolutional recurrent neural network combining an opcode-level convolutional autoencoder with a recurrent classifier achieved strong malware-detection performance and showed that sequential executable information could be learned automatically rather than reduced solely to simple frequency counts (Adnan & Iftekhhar, 2023; Jeon & Moon, 2020). Representation learning has also been applied to long opcode sequences through graph sampling and embedding procedures designed to preserve recurring malicious sequential patterns while reducing computational complexity (Kakisim et al., 2022; Md Asif Ali Sheak & Tahmedur, 2023). These developments are relevant to enterprise memory forensics because memory-derived evidence can contain high-dimensional and relational patterns involving processes, modules, memory allocations, network connections, and behavioral artifacts. A capable machine-learning system may identify relationships across these variables and assign threat probabilities or classifications that help investigators prioritize suspicious observations. However, high predictive performance alone does not establish that a model has learned forensically meaningful relationships. Dataset bias, redundant features, environmental artifacts, malware-family imbalance, overfitting, and changes in execution context can influence reported accuracy. For this research, Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability is therefore treated as a broader organizational and analytical capability involving accurate pattern recognition, reliable classification, sensitivity to malicious memory behavior, discrimination between benign and hostile observations, and consistency of automated threat assessment. Examining this construct within an enterprise memory-forensic context permits machine-learning performance to be evaluated as part of the overall process through which volatile cyber-threat indicators are identified, interpreted, and converted into defensible investigative judgments.


Explainable Artificial Intelligence in Cybersecurity and Digital Forensics

Explainable artificial intelligence has become an important analytical dimension of cybersecurity because complex machine-learning models can produce accurate classifications while providing limited visibility into the reasoning behind predictions. In security operations, this lack of transparency can be problematic because analysts must determine not only whether an event has been labeled as malicious, but also which observable characteristics contributed to that judgment and whether those characteristics are technically meaningful. Explainability therefore concerns the capacity of an artificial intelligence system to communicate the factors, patterns, or relationships that influence its output in a form that human users can understand and evaluate. Within cybersecurity, explanation can operate at global and local levels. Global explanation describes the behavior of a model, while local explanation focuses on the reasoning associated with a particular alert, malware sample, connection, process, or forensic observation. Explainability methods can also be intrinsic, where interpretability is built into the predictive model, or post hoc, where additional techniques are applied after training to explain a more complex classifier. A broad cybersecurity review identified explainability as relevant to intrusion detection, malware classification, vulnerability analysis, and other security tasks in which human operators must assess automated outputs and distinguish meaningful threats from false alarms (Charmet et al., 2022; Md Kaium, 2023). This relationship is highly relevant to enterprise memory forensics because memory-derived threat detection may involve many correlated features representing processes, modules, network connections, privileges, injected regions, handles, and other volatile artifacts. If a machine-learning system classifies a memory observation as suspicious without indicating the contributing indicators, investigators may be unable to determine whether the prediction reflects genuine malicious behavior, environmental noise, or an unintended property of the training data. Explainable AI Interpretability Quality therefore represents the degree to which automated threat assessments can be translated into clear, relevant, consistent, and technically understandable evidence for forensic examination.

The value of explainability in cybersecurity becomes clearer when predictive models are applied to detection tasks where false positives, false negatives, and alerts impose cognitive demands on analysts. Intrusion detection research illustrates this problem because deep models may identify anomalous traffic with high accuracy but provide little explanation of the features responsible for classification. An interpretable intrusion-detection architecture combining an autoencoder with an additive tree demonstrated that predictive performance can be paired with a model structure designed to expose

decision patterns rather than presenting only opaque classification outcomes (Md Mahamud Pervaz, 2023; Xu et al., 2021). Similar concerns arise in malware analysis, where models can learn discriminative representations from code sequences while remaining difficult for investigators to interpret. Research on explainable convolutional neural networks for Android malware detection compared model-highlighted opcode locations with LIME-generated explanations and found correspondence between locations considered important by the classifier and those identified by the explanation method (Kinkead et al., 2021; Mohammad Badrul & Md. Mominul, 2023).

Figure 4: Explainable AI Interpretation and Forensic Validation Framework



These studies illustrate that explanation can support technical validation by showing whether a model is focusing on features associated with malicious behavior. In enterprise memory forensics, this validation requirement is important because volatile-memory observations can contain legitimate and malicious activities in close proximity. A process may appear unusual without being hostile, a network connection may be suspicious only when interpreted with process context, and an injected memory region may require supporting evidence before being treated as a reliable indicator. Explanation mechanisms can assist analysts by ranking influential features, identifying relationships, and clarifying why observations received threat scores. However, explanation quality cannot be evaluated solely by appeal or feature importance values. Forensic usefulness also depends on fidelity, stability, comprehensibility, consistency, contextual relevance, and whether the explanation corresponds to the behavior of the classifier. These properties establish explainability as an analytical quality rather than a cosmetic addition to machine-learning output.

Digital forensics introduces requirements for explainability because outputs may contribute to investigative reasoning, evidential interpretation, reporting, and decisions that must remain reviewable by human examiners. The forensic value of artificial intelligence therefore depends not only on computational performance but also on whether an examiner can understand how evidence was processed and how a model reached an assessment. Research examining explainable artificial intelligence for digital forensics emphasized that AI-assisted analysis should support explanations that allow investigators to justify findings and relate them to digital artifacts rather than accepting unexplained outputs (Hall et al., 2022; Molla Al Rakib & Mohammad Towhidul, 2023). A related examination of Digital Forensics AI argued that machine-driven evidence mining requires evaluation, standardization, optimization, interpretability, and human assessment because probabilistic outputs can otherwise be difficult to translate into forensic judgments (Nishat, 2023; Solanke & Biasiotti, 2022). These requirements are relevant to enterprise memory forensics, where a classification may influence which processes are investigated, which memory regions receive analysis, how compromise indicators are prioritized, and how an incident narrative is constructed. Explainable AI can provide local explanations for memory observations and global explanations describing model behavior across cases. Feature attribution can indicate which memory characteristics contributed to a prediction, while interpretable rules can express combinations of conditions associated with malicious classification.

Forensic analysts can then compare these explanations with domain knowledge, corroborating artifacts, and incident context. For the present study, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality therefore encompasses clarity, transparency, relevance, consistency, comprehensibility, and the extent to which explanations connect machine-generated threat assessments with forensic indicators. Its relationship with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance is important because explanation provides a bridge between automated pattern recognition and human investigative reasoning. Measuring this construct alongside machine-learning capability, memory-forensic indicator identification, and analyst decision support allows the study to examine explainability as an integrated component of enterprise memory-forensic analysis rather than an isolated technical characteristic.


Analyst Decision Support and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance

Analyst decision support represents the combination of information, technologies, processes, and organizational arrangements that assists cybersecurity professionals in recognizing threats, interpreting evidence, prioritizing alerts, and selecting appropriate investigative actions. Within enterprise memory forensics, decision support is especially important because analysts must transform large collections of volatile artifacts into coherent judgments about malicious activity. Memory images may contain thousands of processes, modules, sockets, handles, privileges, memory regions, and other objects, many of which are legitimate and context dependent. Automated systems can reduce this analytical burden by filtering observations, ranking suspicious indicators, correlating related artifacts, and presenting evidence in forms that help investigators determine which activities require attention. Cyber threat intelligence research has emphasized that technical threat information becomes useful when it is transformed into evidence-based knowledge capable of supporting security decisions rather than remaining a collection of isolated indicators (Syed Feroz, 2023; Tounsi & Rais, 2018). This distinction is directly relevant to Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance because the presence of an indicator does not automatically establish its investigative significance. Analysts must determine whether an observation is reliable, how it relates to other artifacts, whether it reflects malicious or legitimate behavior, and what level of confidence should be assigned to the resulting assessment. Decision-support capability therefore depends on relevance, timeliness, contextualization, prioritization, and the capacity to connect technical evidence with investigative objectives. In enterprise memory environments, machine learning can support these functions by identifying patterns across high-dimensional features, while explainability can clarify the characteristics influencing a model prediction. Human analysts remain responsible for interpreting those outputs within system context. Analyst Decision-Support Capability can therefore be conceptualized as the extent to which forensic and analytical systems enhance evidence evaluation, reduce unnecessary cognitive effort, improve prioritization, and support consistent cyber-threat judgments without replacing professional reasoning.

Security Operations Centers provide a useful organizational context for understanding analyst decision support because they combine people, processes, technologies, and continuous monitoring activities to detect and investigate cyber incidents. Within a SOC, analysts evaluate alerts, investigate suspicious activity, correlate information from multiple security tools, escalate incidents, document findings, and communicate risk to other stakeholders. A systematic examination of SOC research identified human, technological, and process-related components as central to operational effectiveness and showed that the relationship among these components is essential for coordinated security operations (Tahmedur & Rifat, 2023; Vielberth et al., 2020). These findings are relevant to enterprise memory forensics because memory analysis rarely occurs in isolation; instead, it forms part of a broader investigative workflow involving endpoint telemetry, network information, threat intelligence, incident records, and analyst judgment. Human factors can strongly influence this workflow. Qualitative research involving SOC personnel identified mismatches between managerial expectations and analysts' operational experiences, together with technical and nontechnical issues that can affect efficiency, communication, and the handling of security events (Asheke, 2024; Kokulu et al., 2019). Such conditions demonstrate that effective decision support requires more than additional automated alerts. Systems must organize evidence in ways that correspond to analysts' tasks, reduce ambiguity, highlight meaningful relationships, and enable users to examine the basis of automated recommendations. In memory-forensic investigations, this requirement may involve presenting suspicious processes with associated

network connections, identifying anomalous memory regions, ranking indicators according to investigative relevance, and providing explanations for machine-learning classifications. Poorly structured outputs can increase cognitive workload or create alert fatigue, whereas well-designed support can focus attention on evidence with greater investigative value. Analyst Decision-Support Capability therefore reflects how effectively technical systems integrate information, prioritize observations, preserve contextual relationships, and assist professionals in moving from raw forensic artifacts toward defensible cyber-threat interpretations.

Figure 5: Analyst Decision-Support and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Framework



Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance depends on the quality with which analysts convert security observations into accurate, timely, and defensible assessments. Measuring this performance requires attention to more than the number of alerts processed because analysts perform functions involving investigation quality, reporting, prioritization, escalation, communication, and time-sensitive decision making. A systematic review of SOC analyst research found that performance measurement has often relied on incomplete metrics and identified analysis quality, workload, time, and task-related measures as important considerations when assessing analyst effectiveness (Agyepong et al., 2020; Ashrafuzzaman, 2024). This perspective is important for memory forensics because a rapid classification has limited value if the analyst cannot determine which artifacts support the assessment or distinguish genuine indicators from misleading observations. Cybersecurity decision making is also constrained by knowledge, available resources, risk information, organizational priorities, and the extent to which users can translate technical evidence into appropriate protective choices (Md Kaium, 2024; Osborn & Simpson, 2018). Within the present study, Analyst Decision-Support Capability therefore connects technological outputs with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance by capturing whether analytical systems help professionals understand evidence, prioritize suspicious activity, assess model-generated classifications, and formulate consistent judgments. Machine-learning threat detection may improve the identification of complex patterns, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness may improve the quality of available evidence, and Explainable AI Interpretability Quality may improve understanding of automated predictions, yet these capabilities must reach the analyst in an actionable form. Decision support serves this coordinating function by structuring evidence and reducing the gap between automated detection and professional interpretation. In an enterprise memory-forensic setting, stronger support should be reflected in clearer investigative prioritization, more coherent interpretation of related indicators, more confident evaluation of suspicious memory behavior, and more consistent assessments across cases. This conceptual relationship provides the basis for examining Analyst Decision-Support Capability as an independent predictor of Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance in the quantitative model.


Information Processing Theory as the Theoretical Framework

Information Processing Theory provides a strong theoretical foundation for examining how enterprise memory-forensic environments transform complex cyber evidence into actionable threat interpretations. The theory views organizations as systems that must acquire, process, interpret, and distribute information in order to reduce uncertainty and perform complex tasks effectively. Its central proposition is that performance improves when information-processing capacity is aligned with information-processing requirements. In enterprise cybersecurity, volatile-memory investigations create substantial processing requirements because analysts encounter large quantities of transient, heterogeneous, and technically interdependent artifacts, including processes, modules, memory regions, network connections, handles, privileges, injected code, and other runtime objects. These artifacts possess value only when they are selected, organized, connected, and interpreted in relation to potential malicious behavior. Research grounded in Information Processing Theory has shown that the alignment between extensive data resources and analytical capability matters because information volume alone cannot generate effective outcomes without corresponding capacity to process and interpret it (Mukut Kanti, 2024; Song et al., 2020). Related empirical work has demonstrated that visibility and analytics capability operate as complementary information-processing resources under conditions of environmental uncertainty, supporting the broader proposition that organizations require sufficient analytical capacity to convert complex data into useful decisions (Srinivasan & Swink, 2018; Syed Feroz, 2024). Applied to this study, enterprise memory evidence represents the information-processing requirement, while Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, and Analyst Decision-Support Capability represent complementary elements of information-processing capacity. Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance reflects the resulting quality of the information-processing outcome. This theoretical mapping is appropriate because threat interpretation requires more than collecting evidence; it requires sufficient computational and human capacity to convert fragmented volatile artifacts into coherent judgments concerning malicious activity, investigative priority, and the meaning of observed cyber-threat indicators.

Within the present research, the theoretical logic of information processing can be translated into a sequence linking evidence availability, analytical capacity, explanation, and human interpretation. Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability increases processing capacity by enabling automated recognition of complex malicious patterns that may be difficult to identify manually. Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness improves the quality of information entering the analytical process because relevant processes, modules, connections, injected regions, privileges, and other artifacts must be identified accurately before they can support threat assessment. Explainable AI Interpretability Quality contributes by converting opaque model outputs into understandable representations of influential features and decision logic, while Analyst Decision-Support Capability organizes these outputs into forms that assist prioritization, verification, and investigative judgment. Cybersecurity-specific research grounded in Information Processing Theory has shown that organizations can develop analytical information-processing capacity to seek, interpret, and exploit threat-related information during cybersecurity incident response, strengthening awareness and supporting enterprise security performance (Naseer et al., 2021; Uddin & Risha, 2024). Research in critical-infrastructure settings has likewise shown that cybersecurity professionals depend on information-sharing networks and communication channels to access threat information and response alternatives under conditions of uncertainty (Randall & Allen, 2021; Syed Feroz, 2024). The parallel with enterprise memory forensics is direct: volatile evidence creates high information-processing demand, and the four explanatory constructs provide distinct but related forms of processing capacity. Their combined effect is expected to improve Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance by enabling more accurate recognition, clearer explanation, better evidence contextualization, and stronger analyst judgment. The study therefore treats information processing not as a single technological function but as an integrated mechanism in which automated analytics, forensic evidence quality, interpretability, and human decision support jointly determine how effectively cyber-threat indicators are converted into defensible security assessments across the selected enterprise cases.

The theoretical framework also provides a clear basis for specifying the quantitative model used to test the study hypotheses. Information Processing Theory suggests that stronger performance should occur when processing capabilities adequately respond to the complexity and uncertainty of the information environment. In memory forensics, this means that Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance should increase when enterprises possess stronger machine-learning detection, more effective identification of forensic indicators, higher-quality explainability, and better analyst decision support. Research applying the theory to information-intensive operational settings has shown that effective information processing depends on mechanisms that reduce uncertainty by improving the acquisition, interpretation, communication, and use of relevant information (Wijewickrama et al., 2022).

Figure 6: Information Processing Theory Framework for Enterprise Memory Forensics



This principle supports the simultaneous examination of the four independent variables rather than treating each capability as an isolated technical function. The principal empirical equation for the entire study is presented below, where $CTIP_i$ denotes Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance for respondent i ; β_0 is the intercept; β_1 to β_4 represent the estimated effects of Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, and Analyst Decision-Support Capability; and ε_i represents unexplained variation. This multiple-regression specification operationalizes the theoretical proposition that several information-processing capacities jointly influence the quality of an information-processing outcome. H1 is represented by $\beta_1 > 0$, H2 by $\beta_2 > 0$, H3 by $\beta_3 > 0$, and H4 by $\beta_4 > 0$, with statistical significance evaluated at the predetermined threshold. Descriptive statistics establish the perceived level of each capability, Pearson correlations evaluate their bivariate relationships with CTIP, and the regression model determines their relative predictive effects while the remaining predictors are held constant.

$$CTIP_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 MLTDC_i + \beta_2 MFIIE_i + \beta_3 XAIQ_i + \beta_4 ADSC_i + \varepsilon_i$$


Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development

The conceptual framework of this study integrates four explanatory constructs, Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, and Analyst Decision-Support Capability, with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance as the dependent construct. The framework reflects the assumption that enterprise memory-forensic effectiveness emerges from the coordinated processing of technical evidence rather than from a single analytical function. Machine-learning capability represents the ability of automated models to distinguish malicious and benign patterns, recognize complex relationships, and support scalable analysis across large volumes of cyber evidence. Research on operational intrusion detection has shown that machine-learning performance is strongly conditioned by the characteristics of real-world security environments, including variability in traffic, limited ground truth, evolving attack

behavior, and the difference between closed experimental datasets and open operational conditions (Sommer & Paxson, 2010). Broader cyber-analytics research has likewise demonstrated that classification performance depends on the suitability of algorithms, data representations, training conditions, and evaluation procedures used for security detection tasks (Buczak & Guven, 2016). These observations support the inclusion of Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability as the first predictor in the conceptual model because predictive performance must be evaluated as an operational capability rather than as an isolated accuracy score. Within enterprise memory forensics, model outputs are produced from volatile evidence that may contain legitimate and malicious activities simultaneously. The proposed framework therefore positions machine learning as one part of a larger interpretive process in which automated pattern recognition must operate alongside effective forensic indicator identification, transparent explanations, and analyst-oriented decision support. Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance represents the extent to which these combined capabilities enable security professionals to recognize, contextualize, and assess meaningful threats from complex memory-derived evidence. Accordingly, the first proposed relationship predicts that stronger machine-learning threat detection capability will be associated with higher cyber-threat interpretation performance across the enterprise cases.

The second and third relationships in the conceptual framework concern Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness and Explainable AI Interpretability Quality. Effective indicator identification determines whether the analytical process begins with relevant and sufficiently reliable evidence. Memory artifacts such as suspicious processes, unusual parent-child relationships, injected regions, loaded modules, network connections, privilege anomalies, and other runtime objects must be extracted and organized before they can contribute to threat classification. If the selected indicators are incomplete, noisy, or weakly related to malicious behavior, even a sophisticated classifier may produce unstable results. Security-focused machine-learning research has long emphasized that adversaries can manipulate data or exploit weaknesses in learning systems, demonstrating that the trustworthiness of a prediction depends on the robustness of both the input representation and the analytical model (Barreno et al., 2006).

Figure 7: Conceptual Framework Linking MLTDC, MFIE, XAIQ, ADSC, and CTIP



Explainability adds another layer by allowing analysts to inspect which features or conditions contributed to a classification. In intrusion-detection settings, interpretable decision structures and explanation mechanisms have been used to increase understanding of model behavior and strengthen

user trust in automated security decisions (Mahbooba et al., 2021). These findings support the conceptual separation between detection performance and explanation quality. A model can classify an observation correctly while offering little insight into the forensic basis of its output, whereas a useful explanation can identify influential indicators and enable analysts to evaluate whether the classification is technically credible. The framework therefore proposes that Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness contributes to Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance by improving evidential quality, while Explainable AI Interpretability Quality contributes by improving transparency, comprehensibility, and forensic defensibility. Together, these constructs represent the quality of evidence entering the analytical process and the quality of interpretation attached to machine-generated outputs. The fourth relationship concerns Analyst Decision-Support Capability, which connects automated detection and explanatory outputs with human investigative judgment. In enterprise cybersecurity, evidence becomes operationally useful when analysts can assess its relevance, compare related indicators, prioritize suspicious activity, and incorporate the resulting information into coherent incident interpretations. Research on cyber-threat intelligence quality has shown that attributes such as accuracy, completeness, timeliness, relevance, and transparent quality assessment influence whether threat information can support informed security decisions (Schlette et al., 2021). This logic supports the inclusion of Analyst Decision-Support Capability because memory-forensic systems must present machine-generated findings in forms that assist verification and prioritization rather than merely produce classifications.

The conceptual framework therefore proposes four positive paths toward Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance: MLTDC to CTIP, MFIIE to CTIP, XAIQ to CTIP, and ADSC to CTIP. These relationships are represented by the study's principal empirical model. The hypothesis structure follows directly from this equation: H1: $\beta_1 > 0$, H2: $\beta_2 > 0$, H3: $\beta_3 > 0$, and H4: $\beta_4 > 0$. Pearson correlation analysis assesses the bivariate direction and strength of each relationship, while multiple regression determines whether each predictor contributes significantly to CTIP within the integrated model. Conceptually, the framework treats high Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance as the outcome of accurate automated detection, effective identification of memory indicators, understandable explanations, and decision support that enables analysts to convert technical evidence into consistent and defensible threat assessments. The combined model thus connects computational capability, evidential quality, interpretability, and human judgment within one measurable structure and permits the four hypotheses to be evaluated against the same dependent construct using standardized coefficients, significance tests, explained variance, and model-level statistics.


$$CTIP_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 MLTDC_i + \beta_2 MFIIE_i + \beta_3 XAIQ_i + \beta_4 ADSC_i + \varepsilon_i$$

METHOD

This study has adopted a quantitative, cross-sectional, case-study-based research design to examine how Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, and Analyst Decision-Support Capability have influenced Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance in enterprise memory-forensic environments. The case-study context has included selected enterprise cybersecurity, digital-forensic, security-operations, incident-response, and threat-analysis settings in which memory analysis and machine-learning-supported security tools have been used. The study population has consisted of cybersecurity analysts, SOC analysts, digital-forensic investigators, malware analysts, incident-response professionals, threat-intelligence specialists, security engineers, and related personnel, while the individual professional respondent has served as the unit of analysis. A purposive sampling strategy has been applied to recruit participants with practical experience in cybersecurity, memory forensics, malware analysis, or AI-enabled security operations. Primary data have been collected through a structured questionnaire using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The instrument has been designed to measure the five study constructs through items adapted to the research context. A pilot test has been conducted with qualified respondents to evaluate clarity, wording, sequencing, and measurement consistency before administration. Content and construct validity have been assessed through expert review and factor-related procedures, while reliability has been evaluated using Cronbach's alpha, with coefficients of .70 or above treated as acceptable. SPSS has been used for

data screening, descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation, multiple regression, reliability analysis, KMO and Bartlett's tests, and hypothesis testing. Microsoft Excel has been used for preliminary data organization and tabulation, EndNote has been used to manage the reference library and APA 7th edition citation consistency, and Microsoft Word has been used for manuscript preparation and reporting.


Figure 8: Quantitative Research Design and Analytical Procedure



FINDINGS

The findings have provided an integrated quantitative assessment of Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability (MLTDC), Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness (MFIIE), Explainable AI Interpretability Quality (XAIQ), Analyst Decision-Support Capability (ADSC), and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance (CTIP) within the selected enterprise memory-forensic cases. A total of 320 questionnaires have been distributed, 301 have been returned, and 289 have satisfied the screening requirements for statistical analysis, producing a usable response rate of 90.3%. Reliability and validity testing has demonstrated satisfactory measurement quality, with Cronbach's alpha coefficients ranging from .85 to .91, an overall KMO value of .892, and a statistically significant Bartlett's Test of Sphericity, $p < .001$. The descriptive results have shown generally high evaluations across all five constructs on the five-point Likert scale. CTIP has recorded the highest overall mean, $M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.51$, followed by MFIIE, $M = 4.18$, $SD = 0.54$, XAIQ, $M = 4.15$, $SD = 0.56$, ADSC, $M = 4.12$, $SD = 0.58$, and MLTDC, $M = 4.10$, $SD = 0.59$. These results have indicated that respondents have perceived strong capabilities for identifying volatile-memory indicators, interpreting machine-learning outputs, supporting analysts, and converting forensic evidence into meaningful cyber-threat assessments. Pearson correlation analysis has shown significant positive relationships between all four predictors and CTIP. MFIIE has demonstrated the strongest association with CTIP, $r = .76$, followed by XAIQ, $r = .72$, ADSC, $r = .70$, and MLTDC, $r = .68$, with all relationships significant at $p < .001$. Multiple regression analysis has further demonstrated that the four predictors have jointly explained 71.4% of the variance in CTIP, $R^2 = .714$, Adjusted $R^2 = .710$, $F(4, 284) = 177.25$, $p < .001$. MFIIE has produced the strongest standardized effect, $\beta = .32$, followed by XAIQ, $\beta = .28$, ADSC, $\beta = .23$, and MLTDC, $\beta = .19$. Consequently, H1, H2, H3, and H4 have all received statistical support. From the perspective of Information Processing Theory, these findings have indicated that stronger information-processing capabilities in detection, evidence identification, explanation, and analyst support have been associated with stronger cyber-threat interpretation outcomes.

Figure 9: Correlation and Regression Effects on Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance



Response Rate and Data Screening

Table 1: Response Rate and Data Screening Summary

Response Category	Frequency	Percentage
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Questionnaires distributed	320	100.0%
Questionnaires returned	301	94.1%
Incomplete or unusable responses	12	3.8%
Valid responses retained	289	90.3%
Final sample used for analysis	289	90.3%

Table 1 has summarized the response rate and data-screening process undertaken before the statistical analyses have been conducted. A total of 320 questionnaires have been distributed to cybersecurity analysts, SOC personnel, digital-forensic investigators, incident-response specialists, malware analysts, threat-intelligence professionals, and security engineers with relevant enterprise-level experience. Of these questionnaires, 301 have been returned, representing a gross response rate of 94.1%. Following screening for completeness, response consistency, excessive missing values, and suitability for statistical analysis, 12 questionnaires have been excluded because they have contained incomplete or analytically unusable information. Consequently, 289 questionnaires have been retained as the final analytical sample, representing 90.3% of the originally distributed instruments. This usable response level has provided a sufficiently large dataset for descriptive statistics, reliability testing, correlation analysis, and multiple regression modeling involving four independent variables. The screening process has also strengthened the internal consistency of subsequent analyses because only complete and interpretable cases have been retained. The final sample has therefore provided the empirical foundation for testing the objectives and hypotheses related to MLTDC, MFIIIE, XAIQ, ADSC, and CTIP. From an Information Processing Theory perspective, adequate representation of practitioners operating within information-intensive cybersecurity contexts has been important because the theoretical model has concerned the capability of enterprise systems and analysts to process complex forensic information under uncertainty. The retained respondents have represented professionals directly engaged with cybersecurity evidence, detection technologies, and investigative decision making, which has increased the contextual relevance of the measurements. The satisfactory sample size has also permitted estimation of multivariate relationships with reasonable statistical stability. The response profile has therefore established a suitable empirical base from which the study has evaluated whether stronger technological and human information-processing capabilities have corresponded with stronger cyber-threat interpretation performance across the selected enterprise memory-forensic cases.

Respondent Demographic and Professional Profile

Table 2: Respondent Demographic and Professional Profile

Characteristic	Category	Frequency	Percentage
Professional role	SOC/Cybersecurity Analyst	82	28.4%
	Digital Forensic Investigator	58	20.1%
	Incident-Response Professional	48	16.6%
	Malware/Threat Intelligence Analyst	46	15.9%
	Security Engineer/Related Role	55	19.0%
Experience	1-3 years	76	26.3%
	4-6 years	91	31.5%
	7-10 years	68	23.5%

Enterprise context	More than 10 years	54	18.7%
	Financial services	72	24.9%
	Technology/Cloud services	69	23.9%
	Government/Critical infrastructure	58	20.1%
	Telecommunications	47	16.3%
	Other enterprise environments	43	14.9%

Table 2 has presented the professional and organizational characteristics of the 289 valid respondents. SOC and cybersecurity analysts have represented the largest professional group, accounting for 82 respondents or 28.4% of the sample. Digital-forensic investigators have accounted for 20.1%, security engineers and related professionals for 19.0%, incident-response professionals for 16.6%, and malware or threat-intelligence analysts for 15.9%. This distribution has indicated that the sample has incorporated professionals from several complementary stages of enterprise threat detection and forensic interpretation rather than concentrating on a single occupational category. Regarding professional experience, the largest group has consisted of respondents with four to six years of experience, representing 31.5% of the sample. Participants with one to three years have represented 26.3%, those with seven to ten years have represented 23.5%, and those with more than ten years have accounted for 18.7%. The sample has therefore included both developing and highly experienced practitioners. Financial services have accounted for 24.9% of respondents, technology and cloud-service environments for 23.9%, government and critical infrastructure for 20.1%, telecommunications for 16.3%, and other enterprise settings for 14.9%. This distribution has strengthened the case-study context by incorporating environments characterized by high information-processing requirements and substantial cybersecurity exposure. From the perspective of Information Processing Theory, these professional and organizational characteristics have been particularly relevant because the study has examined how technological and analyst-oriented capabilities have supported the processing of complex cyber information. Respondents with experience in detection, forensics, incident response, threat intelligence, and engineering have been positioned to evaluate whether machine-learning outputs, volatile-memory indicators, explainable information, and analyst-support mechanisms have assisted cyber-threat interpretation. The diversity of professional roles and enterprise contexts has therefore enhanced the empirical basis for assessing the study objectives and hypotheses across different but related information-intensive cybersecurity environments.

Reliability and Validity of the Research Constructs

Table 3: Reliability and Construct Validity Results

Construct	Items	Cronbach's α	Factor Loading Range	Reliability Result
MLTDC	5	.86	.71-.84	Reliable
MFIE	5	.90	.75-.88	Highly reliable
XAIQ	5	.88	.73-.86	Reliable
ADSC	5	.85	.70-.83	Reliable
CTIP	5	.91	.77-.89	Highly reliable
Overall instrument	25	.93		Highly reliable
KMO / Bartlett Test		.892	$\chi^2(300) = 2,146.37$	$p < .001$

Table 3 has demonstrated that the measurement instrument has achieved satisfactory internal consistency and construct validity. Cronbach's alpha coefficients have exceeded the commonly

accepted .70 threshold for all five constructs. MLTDC has produced $\alpha = .86$, MFIIE has produced $\alpha = .90$, XAIQ has produced $\alpha = .88$, ADSC has produced $\alpha = .85$, and CTIP has recorded the highest construct-level reliability at $\alpha = .91$. The overall 25-item instrument has generated a Cronbach's alpha coefficient of .93, indicating strong internal consistency across the complete questionnaire. The factor-loading ranges have also remained satisfactory, with all reported loadings exceeding .70. MFIIE items have ranged from .75 to .88, XAIQ from .73 to .86, MLTDC from .71 to .84, ADSC from .70 to .83, and CTIP from .77 to .89. These results have indicated that the items have been strongly associated with their intended constructs. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure has reached .892, demonstrating strong sampling adequacy for factor-related assessment. Bartlett's Test of Sphericity has also been statistically significant, $\chi^2(300) = 2,146.37$, $p < .001$, showing that the correlation structure among the questionnaire items has been sufficiently strong for construct evaluation. These reliability and validity findings have supported the use of composite construct scores in subsequent descriptive, correlational, and regression analyses. The results have also been theoretically important because Information Processing Theory has conceptualized the four independent variables as distinguishable dimensions of organizational information-processing capacity. The satisfactory measurement results have shown that detection capability, forensic indicator identification, explainability, analyst decision support, and interpretation performance have been measured as empirically distinguishable yet internally coherent constructs. Accordingly, the reliability and validity evidence has provided a sound measurement foundation for testing whether stronger information-processing capabilities have been associated with higher Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance.

Cyber-Threat Interpretation Variables**Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Research Constructs**

Variable	Mean	SD	Likert Interpretation	Rank
Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance (CTIP)	4.21	0.51	Very High	1
Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness (MFIIE)	4.18	0.54	High	2
Explainable AI Interpretability Quality (XAIQ)	4.15	0.56	High	3
Analyst Decision-Support Capability (ADSC)	4.12	0.58	High	4
Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability (MLTDC)	4.10	0.59	High	5

Five-point Likert scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree.

Table 4 has presented the descriptive statistics for the five principal constructs measured through the five-point Likert scale. CTIP has achieved the highest overall mean, $M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.51$, indicating that respondents have generally perceived a very strong level of effectiveness in interpreting cyber-threat indicators within the selected enterprise memory-forensic environments. MFIIE has recorded the highest mean among the independent variables, $M = 4.18$, $SD = 0.54$, indicating that respondents have strongly agreed that relevant volatile-memory indicators have been effectively identified, organized, and interpreted during cyber investigations. XAIQ has produced $M = 4.15$, $SD = 0.56$, showing that machine-generated classifications have generally been accompanied by explanations perceived as clear, relevant, understandable, and sufficiently transparent. ADSC has recorded $M = 4.12$, $SD = 0.58$, demonstrating that respondents have generally agreed that analytical systems have supported evidence evaluation, investigative prioritization, and threat-related decision making. MLTDC has produced $M = 4.10$, $SD = 0.59$, which has remained within the high agreement range and has indicated favorable perceptions of machine-learning-based pattern recognition and threat-classification capability. The relatively small standard deviations have shown that responses have remained reasonably concentrated around the high mean values, suggesting substantial consistency among participants. These findings have addressed the objectives concerned with assessing the perceived levels of the four explanatory capabilities and CTIP. From an Information Processing Theory perspective, the results have shown that the examined enterprises have possessed relatively strong information-processing capacities across evidence detection, forensic identification, explanation, and analyst support. The high CTIP mean has been consistent with the theoretical expectation that stronger information-processing resources have been associated with effective interpretation outcomes. However, the descriptive results alone have not established predictive effects; they have instead provided the empirical basis for the correlation and regression analyses that have subsequently tested the hypothesized relationships.

Correlation Analysis Among MLTDC, MFIIE, XAIQ, ADSC, and CTIP**Table 5: Pearson Correlation Matrix**

Variable	MLTDC	MFIIE	XAIQ	ADSC	CTIP
MLTDC	1.00				
MFIIE	.61***	1.00			
XAIQ	.58***	.63***	1.00		
ADSC	.56***	.60***	.65***	1.00	
CTIP	.68***	.76***	.72***	.70***	1.00

*** $p < .001$, $N = 289$.

Table 5 has shown that all four independent variables have maintained positive and statistically significant relationships with CTIP. MFIIE has demonstrated the strongest bivariate association with CTIP, $r = .76$, $p < .001$, indicating that stronger capability to identify and interpret memory-forensic indicators has been associated with higher cyber-threat interpretation performance. XAIQ has produced the second strongest relationship, $r = .72$, $p < .001$, showing that clearer and more meaningful explanations of machine-learning outputs have corresponded with stronger interpretation performance. ADSC has been positively related to CTIP, $r = .70$, $p < .001$, indicating that stronger analytical support for evidence evaluation and investigative prioritization has been associated with better threat interpretation. MLTDC has also demonstrated a strong positive correlation with CTIP, $r = .68$, $p < .001$, showing that improved machine-learning threat detection capability has been associated with stronger interpretation outcomes. The correlations among the independent variables have ranged from .56 to .65, suggesting meaningful relationships while remaining below levels that would ordinarily indicate severe multicollinearity. These results have provided preliminary support for H1, H2, H3, and H4 because each proposed predictor has demonstrated the expected positive relationship with CTIP. The results have also addressed the objective of determining the direction and strength of relationships among the study variables. From an Information Processing Theory perspective, the correlation pattern has supported the proposition that complementary information-processing capabilities have worked together within the enterprise memory-forensic environment. Detection capability has supported the identification of complex patterns, forensic indicator effectiveness has improved evidential quality, explainability has enhanced interpretive transparency, and analyst support has strengthened the use of processed information. The strongest association involving MFIIE has suggested that the quality and relevance of memory-derived evidence have been especially important within this integrated processing system. However, because correlation has not controlled for the simultaneous influence of the other predictors, multiple regression has subsequently been applied to determine the independent predictive contribution of each construct.

Multiple Regression Model for Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance

Table 6 has demonstrated that the combined regression model has provided a strong statistical explanation of Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. The multiple correlation coefficient has reached $R = .845$, indicating a strong combined relationship between MLTDC, MFIIE, XAIQ, ADSC, and CTIP. The coefficient of determination has been $R^2 = .714$, showing that the four explanatory constructs have jointly accounted for 71.4% of the observed variance in CTIP. The adjusted coefficient of determination has remained very similar at .710, indicating that the model has retained substantial explanatory power after adjustment for the number of predictors. Only 28.6% of the variance has remained unexplained by the four-construct model and may have reflected additional technological, organizational, human, or contextual factors outside the scope of the study. The overall regression equation has been statistically significant, $F(4, 284) = 177.25$, $p < .001$, showing that the combined predictor set has explained significantly more variation in CTIP than would have been expected from an intercept-only model. The standard error of estimate has been .274, indicating relatively limited prediction error around the fitted regression values. The Durbin-Watson statistic has reached 1.94,

which has remained close to the benchmark value of 2.00 and has indicated no substantial concern regarding autocorrelation of residuals. These findings have directly addressed the objective of determining the combined predictive effect of the four explanatory capabilities on CTIP. The results have also strongly aligned with Information Processing Theory because the theory has proposed that performance improves when organizational information-processing capacity matches the complexity and uncertainty of information-processing requirements. In this research, enterprise memory evidence has represented the demanding information environment, while machine-learning detection, forensic indicator identification, explainability, and analyst decision support have represented complementary processing capacities. The high R^2 value has shown that these combined capabilities have explained a substantial proportion of threat-interpretation performance, supporting the theoretical expectation that integrated information-processing resources have been closely associated with stronger investigative outcomes.

Table 6: Multiple Regression Model Summary for CTIP

Model Statistic	Result
R	.845
R^2	.714
Adjusted R^2	.710
Standard Error of Estimate	.274
F	177.25
df	4, 284
Significance	$p < .001$
Durbin-Watson	1.94

Hypothesis Testing and Predictive Effects of the Independent Variables

Table 7: Regression Coefficients and Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis	Relationship	B	SE	β	t	p	VIF	Decision
H1	MLTDC → CTIP	.17	.035	.19	4.86	<.001	1.72	Supported
H2	MFIIE → CTIP	.30	.040	.32	7.50	<.001	1.96	Supported
H3	XAIQ → CTIP	.25	.039	.28	6.41	<.001	2.07	Supported
H4	ADSC → CTIP	.21	.040	.23	5.25	<.001	2.12	Supported

Table 7 has presented the individual predictive effects of the four explanatory variables after their simultaneous inclusion in the multiple regression model. MFIIE has emerged as the strongest predictor of CTIP, $\beta = .32$, $t = 7.50$, $p < .001$, thereby supporting H2. This finding has indicated that respondents reporting stronger effectiveness in identifying, contextualizing, and interpreting volatile-memory indicators have also reported stronger overall cyber-threat interpretation performance when the remaining variables have been statistically controlled. XAIQ has produced the second strongest standardized effect, $\beta = .28$, $t = 6.41$, $p < .001$, supporting H3 and showing that understandable and technically meaningful explanations have made a significant independent contribution to CTIP. ADSC has also demonstrated a significant positive effect, $\beta = .23$, $t = 5.25$, $p < .001$, supporting H4 and indicating that effective evidence presentation, prioritization, and analytical assistance have

contributed independently to stronger threat interpretation. MLTDC has produced $\beta = .19$, $t = 4.86$, $p < .001$, supporting H1 and confirming that machine-learning detection capability has remained a significant predictor even after forensic identification, explainability, and decision support have been controlled. Variance Inflation Factor values have ranged from 1.72 to 2.12, substantially below commonly applied multicollinearity concern levels, showing that the predictors have contributed sufficiently distinct information to the regression equation. These results have demonstrated that each of the four hypotheses has received statistical support. Information Processing Theory has provided a coherent explanation for this pattern because each predictor has represented a different information-processing resource. MFIIE has strengthened the quality of information extracted from volatile memory, XAIQ has improved interpretability, ADSC has supported human use of processed information, and MLTDC has enabled scalable pattern recognition. Their simultaneous statistical significance has shown that effective cyber-threat interpretation has depended on an integrated information-processing system rather than on any single technological capability.

Summary of Findings According to Research Objectives and Hypotheses

Table 8: Summary of Objectives, Statistical Evidence, and Hypothesis Outcomes

Research Objective / Hypothesis	Key Statistical Evidence	Result
Assess MLTDC	$M = 4.10$, $SD = 0.59$	High capability
Assess MFIIE	$M = 4.18$, $SD = 0.54$	High capability
Assess XAIQ	$M = 4.15$, $SD = 0.56$	High capability
Assess ADSC	$M = 4.12$, $SD = 0.58$	High capability
Assess CTIP	$M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.51$	Very high performance
H1: MLTDC $\rightarrow$ CTIP	$r = .68$; $\beta = .19$; $p < .001$	Supported
H2: MFIIE $\rightarrow$ CTIP	$r = .76$; $\beta = .32$; $p < .001$	Supported
H3: XAIQ $\rightarrow$ CTIP	$r = .72$; $\beta = .28$; $p < .001$	Supported
H4: ADSC $\rightarrow$ CTIP	$r = .70$; $\beta = .23$; $p < .001$	Supported
Combined predictive objective	$R^2 = .714$; Adj. $R^2 = .710$; $F(4,284) = 177.25$, $p < .001$	Objective achieved

Table 8 has integrated the descriptive, correlation, regression, objective-based, and hypothesis-testing results into a single summary of the study findings. The descriptive objectives have been achieved because all five constructs have been measured and interpreted using the five-point Likert scale. CTIP has recorded the highest mean at 4.21, indicating very high perceived cyber-threat interpretation performance. Among the explanatory variables, MFIIE has produced the highest mean at 4.18, followed by XAIQ at 4.15, ADSC at 4.12, and MLTDC at 4.10. The relational objectives have also been achieved because Pearson correlation analysis has demonstrated that all four independent variables have maintained strong, positive, and statistically significant associations with CTIP. MFIIE has demonstrated the strongest relationship at $r = .76$, while MLTDC, XAIQ, and ADSC have also produced substantial coefficients ranging from .68 to .72. The predictive objective has been achieved through multiple regression, with the four constructs jointly explaining 71.4% of the variance in CTIP. The regression coefficients have shown that MFIIE has exerted the strongest independent effect, followed by XAIQ, ADSC, and MLTDC. Consequently, H1, H2, H3, and H4 have all been statistically supported at $p < .001$. The complete pattern has aligned closely with Information Processing Theory because the results have shown that effective interpretation has been associated with several complementary forms of information-processing capacity. Enterprise memory investigations have required accurate technological detection, reliable identification of relevant forensic evidence, understandable explanations of automated classifications, and effective support for human analytical judgment. The study has therefore demonstrated that cyber-threat interpretation performance has not been associated with machine-learning capability alone. Instead, the strongest empirical results have emerged when

technological, evidential, interpretive, and human decision-support capabilities have been considered together within one integrated quantitative model. This pattern has directly connected the empirical findings with the theoretical framework and has provided a consistent basis for the subsequent discussion of practical, theoretical, and research-related interpretations.

DISCUSSION

The findings have demonstrated that enterprise cyber-threat interpretation performance has been strongly associated with the combined quality of machine-learning detection, memory-forensic indicator identification, explainability, and analyst decision support. Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance has recorded the highest descriptive mean, $M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.51$, while Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness has achieved the highest mean among the independent variables, $M = 4.18$, $SD = 0.54$. Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, Analyst Decision-Support Capability, and Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability have also received high evaluations, with means of 4.15, 4.12, and 4.10, respectively. These results have indicated that respondents have viewed enterprise memory-forensic performance as a multidimensional capability rather than a function of automated classification alone. The correlation analysis has reinforced this interpretation because MFIIE has shown the strongest association with CTIP, $r = .76$, followed by XAIQ, $r = .72$, ADSC, $r = .70$, and MLTDC, $r = .68$, with all relationships significant at $p < .001$. This pattern has been consistent with earlier work demonstrating that volatile-memory evidence becomes useful when system objects, processes, network activity, injected code, and other runtime artifacts are reconstructed into structured and meaningful forensic information (Case & Richard, 2017; Nyholm et al., 2022). The relatively stronger role of MFIIE has also been consistent with studies showing that memory-derived features can provide effective foundations for malware detection and classification when the relevant indicators are extracted and represented appropriately (Bozkir et al., 2021; Sihwail et al., 2021). At the same time, the significant contribution of MLTDC has supported previous research demonstrating that machine-learning and deep-learning approaches can identify malicious patterns across complex cybersecurity data and improve automated detection capacity (Gibert et al., 2020; Ucci et al., 2019). The present findings have extended this earlier literature by showing that machine-learning capability has remained important within an integrated memory-forensic setting, but its influence has been stronger when combined with evidential quality, explanation, and analyst-oriented support. This result has clarified that enterprise cyber-threat interpretation has depended on the coordinated transformation of volatile evidence into usable investigative knowledge rather than the isolated performance of a classification algorithm.

The regression analysis has provided stronger evidence regarding the relative contribution of the four explanatory constructs. The overall model has explained 71.4% of the variance in CTIP, $R^2 = .714$, Adjusted $R^2 = .710$, $F(4, 284) = 177.25$, $p < .001$, demonstrating that the integrated model has possessed substantial explanatory power. MFIIE has emerged as the strongest independent predictor, $\beta = .32$, followed by XAIQ, $\beta = .28$, ADSC, $\beta = .23$, and MLTDC, $\beta = .19$. These coefficients have supported H1 through H4 and have shown that all four capabilities have made statistically significant contributions when considered simultaneously. The stronger standardized effect for MFIIE has suggested that the ability to identify relevant memory artifacts has formed the empirical foundation upon which subsequent automated and human interpretation has depended. This result has aligned with memory-forensic research showing that suspicious processes, injected code, DLL behavior, network activity, and other volatile features can serve as highly informative inputs for automated analysis when they are extracted systematically (Dener et al., 2022; Shah et al., 2022). The substantial contribution of XAIQ has also supported earlier studies arguing that predictive outputs are more useful when analysts can identify the features and reasoning associated with a classification (Arrieta et al., 2020; Guidotti et al., 2018). Cybersecurity-specific research has similarly shown that explainable approaches can expose influential security features and help users assess whether automated classifications rely on meaningful technical evidence (Liu et al., 2022; Warnecke et al., 2020). The present study has added to this literature by empirically positioning explainability as a direct predictor of Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance rather than treating it only as a desirable model characteristic. The lower, yet still significant, beta coefficient for MLTDC has been particularly informative. It has indicated that automated detection has contributed to threat interpretation, but its effect has been weaker than the


combined evidential and interpretive capabilities represented by MFIIE and XAIQ. This result has suggested that model accuracy alone has not determined effective enterprise interpretation. The practical meaning has been that organizations should not evaluate memory-forensic analytics solely through classifier performance metrics. They should also assess whether the model operates on relevant forensic evidence, provides understandable explanations, and presents outputs in a form that supports professional judgment.

From a practical perspective, the findings have indicated that enterprise cybersecurity teams should treat memory-forensic analysis as an integrated socio-technical process in which detection systems, evidential quality, explanation mechanisms, and analyst workflows are designed together. The significant contribution of ADSC, $\beta = .23$, $p < .001$, has shown that analytical performance has depended not only on what the system detects but also on how effectively that information has been communicated and incorporated into investigative decisions. This result has been consistent with research on Security Operations Centers showing that analyst effectiveness is influenced by the interaction of people, technologies, and operational processes rather than by security tools alone (Kokulu et al., 2019; Vielberth et al., 2020). It has also aligned with research indicating that cyber-threat intelligence becomes operationally useful when information is accurate, relevant, timely, contextualized, and presented in ways that support action (Schlette et al., 2021; Tounsi & Rais, 2018). Enterprise memory-forensic systems should therefore prioritize interfaces that correlate suspicious processes with network connections, injected regions, loaded modules, privilege anomalies, and related threat indicators rather than presenting isolated alerts. Explainability mechanisms should be embedded into the same environment so that analysts can see why an observation has received a high threat score and which memory-derived features have contributed most strongly to that classification. The descriptive results have shown that respondents already perceived relatively strong capability across these areas, yet the ranking of the constructs has indicated room for strengthening machine-learning detection and analyst support relative to forensic indicator identification. Organizations can address this gap by improving feature engineering, validating models against heterogeneous enterprise datasets, integrating explainability into alert triage, and structuring memory-forensic outputs according to investigation priorities. Human analysts should also be provided with standardized procedures for reviewing model explanations and corroborating them against raw forensic artifacts. Such practices would reduce the possibility that machine-generated outputs are accepted without technical verification. The practical significance of the findings has therefore rested on the need to preserve analyst authority while improving the speed and consistency with which complex volatile-memory evidence is transformed into defensible cyber-threat assessments.

The findings have also supported the theoretical logic of Information Processing Theory by demonstrating that Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance has been associated with the alignment between complex information-processing requirements and multiple forms of processing capacity. Enterprise memory images create substantial information demands because they contain numerous transient, heterogeneous, and interdependent artifacts that must be selected, organized, interpreted, and prioritized under conditions of uncertainty. Within this theoretical structure, MLTDC has represented computational processing capacity, MFIIE has represented evidential selection and structuring capability, XAIQ has represented interpretive transparency, and ADSC has represented the capacity to convert processed information into human investigative judgment. The high explanatory power of the model, $R^2 = .714$, has supported the proposition that these capacities function collectively rather than independently. This interpretation has been consistent with earlier Information Processing Theory research showing that performance improves when organizations develop analytical capabilities that match the complexity and uncertainty of their information environments (Song et al., 2020; Srinivasan & Swink, 2018). It has also aligned with cybersecurity-specific applications of the theory showing that analytical information-processing capability supports the interpretation and exploitation of security information during incident response (Naseer et al., 2021). The present findings have therefore extended Information Processing Theory into enterprise memory forensics by demonstrating how computational detection, forensic evidence identification, explanation, and human decision support can be conceptualized as interrelated processing capacities. At the same time, several limitations should be considered when interpreting the statistical relationships. The cross-sectional

design has captured perceptions at a single point in time and has therefore not established temporal causality among the constructs. The purposive sampling approach has improved the relevance of professional respondents but has limited statistical generalizability beyond comparable enterprise environments. The use of self-reported five-point Likert measurements has also introduced the possibility of common-method bias and perception-based measurement error. The case-study-based context has further meant that organizational technologies, security maturity, threat exposure, and forensic practices may have differed across participating environments. These limitations have not invalidated the relationships observed, but they have defined the boundaries within which the findings should be interpreted and have highlighted the need for stronger behavioral and experimental validation of the proposed model.

Figure 10: Explainable Memory-Forensic Threat Interpretation and Response Model (EMFTIR-M)



The future research contribution can be organized through a proposed Explainable Memory-Forensic Threat Interpretation and Response Model (EMFTIR-M) that extends the current study from a cross-sectional perception model into a closed-loop operational framework. The proposed model can contain seven interconnected stages: Stage 1, Trusted Memory Acquisition, where volatile evidence is collected with integrity checks and acquisition validation; Stage 2, Forensic Indicator Extraction, where processes, modules, injected regions, handles, privileges, sockets, and related artifacts are transformed into structured features; Stage 3, Machine-Learning Threat Scoring, where validated models classify observations and generate calibrated threat probabilities; Stage 4, Explainability and Evidence Attribution, where local and global explanation methods identify the memory features contributing to each prediction; Stage 5, Analyst Verification and Contextualization, where professionals compare model explanations with raw artifacts, threat intelligence, and incident context; Stage 6, Response Prioritization and Decision Support, where validated findings are ranked according to severity, confidence, business relevance, and investigative urgency; and Stage 7, Feedback-Based Model Refinement, where confirmed analyst judgments are returned to the analytical pipeline to improve features, thresholds, explanation quality, and model calibration. This framework has been derived directly from the empirical ordering of the predictors because MFIE and XAIQ have demonstrated stronger effects than MLTDC alone. The framework therefore places evidence quality and explainability between automated detection and analyst response rather than treating them as optional additions. Future studies can test EMFTIR-M experimentally by using real memory images, controlled malware execution, analyst task-performance measures, and repeated observations across different enterprises. Researchers can also compare alternative explanation methods, model architectures, and feature-selection procedures while measuring analyst accuracy, investigation time, false-positive reduction, and decision confidence. Experimental and longitudinal designs can determine whether improvements at one stage produce measurable gains in subsequent stages. The model can also be evaluated across financial services, healthcare, telecommunications, government, cloud infrastructure,

and critical systems to test contextual robustness. In this way, subsequent research can move beyond perception-based relationships and examine how a closed-loop human-AI memory-forensic system performs under realistic enterprise threat conditions.

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the interpretation of cyber-threat indicators in enterprise memory-forensic environments by integrating Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, Analyst Decision-Support Capability, and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance within a single quantitative model. Using a cross-sectional, case-study-based design and a five-point Likert scale, the study has demonstrated that all four explanatory constructs have been positively and significantly associated with Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. The descriptive findings have shown strong evaluations across the research variables, with CTIP recording the highest mean, $M = 4.21$, $SD = 0.51$, followed by MFIIE, $M = 4.18$, $SD = 0.54$, XAIQ, $M = 4.15$, $SD = 0.56$, ADSC, $M = 4.12$, $SD = 0.58$, and MLTDC, $M = 4.10$, $SD = 0.59$. Correlation analysis has further demonstrated that MFIIE has maintained the strongest relationship with CTIP, $r = .76$, followed by XAIQ, $r = .72$, ADSC, $r = .70$, and MLTDC, $r = .68$, with all relationships significant at $p < .001$. The regression model has explained 71.4% of the variance in CTIP, $R^2 = .714$, Adjusted $R^2 = .710$, $F(4, 284) = 177.25$, $p < .001$. MFIIE has emerged as the strongest predictor, $\beta = .32$, followed by XAIQ, $\beta = .28$, ADSC, $\beta = .23$, and MLTDC, $\beta = .19$, thereby supporting H1, H2, H3, and H4. These findings have confirmed that effective enterprise cyber-threat interpretation depends on more than predictive accuracy alone. It has required reliable forensic evidence, meaningful explanations, and effective analyst support. Information Processing Theory has provided a coherent explanation of this pattern by showing that stronger information-processing capacity has been associated with stronger interpretation outcomes. Overall, the study has established an integrated empirical foundation for understanding how machine intelligence, volatile-memory evidence, explainability, and human analytical judgment collectively support enterprise cyber-threat interpretation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the empirical findings, enterprises should strengthen cyber-threat interpretation by developing an integrated memory-forensic environment in which machine-learning detection, forensic indicator extraction, explainability, and analyst decision support operate as connected capabilities rather than as isolated functions. Since MFIIE has produced the strongest predictive effect on CTIP, $\beta = .32$, organizations should prioritize the quality of memory acquisition, artifact extraction, feature engineering, and indicator validation. Forensic workflows should systematically identify suspicious processes, injected regions, loaded modules, network connections, privilege anomalies, handles, and other runtime artifacts before automated classification is performed. Because XAIQ has also demonstrated a substantial effect, $\beta = .28$, organizations should incorporate explainable AI techniques that allow analysts to understand which forensic features have influenced model decisions and how those features relate to suspected malicious activity. Explanation interfaces should emphasize clarity, consistency, relevance, and technical traceability. The significant contribution of ADSC, $\beta = .23$, indicates that enterprises should improve dashboards, alert prioritization, evidence correlation, contextual visualization, and case-management functions that assist analysts in translating automated outputs into investigative decisions. MLTDC should also be strengthened through continuous model validation, representative training datasets, balanced classes, robust feature selection, and regular performance assessment against changing attack behaviors. Organizations should evaluate machine-learning systems using not only accuracy but also precision, recall, false-positive rate, interpretability, and analyst usefulness. Standard operating procedures should require analysts to validate model explanations against raw memory artifacts and complementary evidence sources before high-impact decisions are made. Training programs should combine digital forensics, machine learning, explainable AI, and incident-response skills so that practitioners can interpret both technical evidence and model behavior. Enterprises should also pilot the proposed Explainable Memory-Forensic Threat Interpretation and Response Model as a structured operational framework for acquisition, detection, explanation, verification, prioritization, and feedback-based improvement.

LIMITATIONS

This study has several limitations that should be considered when interpreting the results. First, the cross-sectional research design has captured respondent perceptions at a single point in time and has therefore not established temporal causality among Machine Learning Threat Detection Capability, Memory Forensic Indicator Identification Effectiveness, Explainable AI Interpretability Quality, Analyst Decision-Support Capability, and Cyber-Threat Interpretation Performance. The significant regression coefficients have demonstrated predictive associations within the model, but they should not be interpreted as definitive causal effects. Second, purposive sampling has been used to recruit participants with relevant professional knowledge, which has increased contextual relevance but has limited the statistical generalizability of the findings to all cybersecurity and digital-forensic professionals. Third, the study has relied on self-reported five-point Likert-scale responses, meaning that the results may have been influenced by respondent perceptions, professional confidence, recall limitations, organizational culture, or socially desirable responses. Fourth, the case-study-based design has included selected enterprise environments that may differ in security maturity, infrastructure complexity, forensic tools, threat exposure, staffing levels, and access to machine-learning capabilities. These contextual differences may have affected how participants evaluated the study constructs. Fifth, the research has measured perceived machine-learning and forensic effectiveness rather than directly benchmarking models against controlled malware datasets, real memory images, or experimentally verified attack scenarios. Sixth, the study has not compared specific machine-learning algorithms, feature-selection techniques, memory-acquisition tools, or explainability methods such as LIME, SHAP, or interpretable rule systems. Seventh, the regression model has explained 71.4% of the variance in CTIP, leaving 28.6% potentially attributable to factors such as analyst expertise, organizational readiness, data quality, incident complexity, tool integration, and governance. Finally, the rapidly changing nature of cyber threats means that the measured relationships have reflected the technologies and professional experiences represented in the selected cases rather than every possible enterprise threat environment.

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